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COMMENTS
THE PROBLEM OF LIABILITY UNDER THE
ILLINOIS STRUCTURAL WORK ACT
INTRODUCTION
Before the enactment of the Illinois Structural Work Act,' an owner
having work done on his premises by an independent contractor was
held not to be liable for an injury caused by the negligence of the inde-
pendent contractor. 2 The Structural Work Act passed in 1907 changed
this situation by providing for the protection and safety of persons in and
about the construction, repairing, alteration or removal of buildings,
bridges and other structures. 3 This act provided:
That all scaffolds, hoists, cranes, stays, ladders, supports, or other mechanical
contrivances, erected or constructed by any person, firm or corporation in this
State for the use in the erection, repairing, alteration, removal or painting of any
house, building, bridge, viaduct, or other structure, shall be erected and con-
structed, in a safe, suitable and proper manner....
Any owner, contractor, sub-contractor, foreman or other person having
charge of the erection, construction, repairing, alteration, removal or painting
of any building ... within the provisions of this act, shall comply with'all the
terms thereof ....
For any injury to person or property, occasioned by any wilful violations of
this act, or wilful failure to comply with any of its provisions, a right of action
should accrue to the party injured, for any direct damages sustained thereby.
4
The actual liability placed upon an owner by this act is still in doubt, for
the courts seem to be in disagreement as to whether the owner must
actually be in charge of the operation before he is liable under this
statute.
HISTORY
The first case to be decided under this act was Claffy v. Chicago Dock
& Canal Co. 5 Recovery was allowed against the owner of the property
for the death of a laborer employed by the independent contractor. In
this case recovery was based on a violation of section 7 of the act, in
which the legislature placed upon the owner the duty to cause shafts or
openings in each floor to be enclosed or fenced in where such openings
1 ILL. REv. STAT. Ch. 48, S§ 60-69 (1959).
2 Jefferson v. Jameson & Morse Co., 165 Il. 138, 46 N.E. 272 (1896); Hale v. John-
son, 80 Ill. 185 (1875); Pfau v. Williamson, 63 111. 16 (1872); Scammon v. City of Chi-
cago, 25 Ill. 361 (1861).
3 Claffy v. Chicago Dock and Canal Co., 249 Ii. 210,94 N.E. 551 (1911).
4 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 60, 69 (1959). (Empsasis added.)
5 249 111. 210, 94 N.E. 551 (1911).
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or shafts existed because of the use of elevating machines or hoists. While
working on the premises, the deceased fell into one of these openings and
was killed.
In this case the court did not specifically concern itself with the lan-
guage of the act imposing liability on those contractors, owners, and
others "having charge of" the work being done. The court stated:
In our opinion it was intended by Section 7 to, and said Section 7 does, impose
upon both the contractor and the owner the duty of complying with the pro-
visions of said section so far as civil liability is concerned .... 6
However, the court did mention that as a matter of fact the owner in this
case was actually in charge of the work being done through its agent,
an architect, who had supervised the work.
This decision was affirmed in O'Donnell v. Riter-Conley Mfg. Co.7
However, six years later in Breton v. Levinson,' the court, in a partially
reported decision, seems to have held contra to the Claffy case. In Breton,
a bricklayer in the employ of an independent contractor who was en-
gaged in the construction of a wall, was killed as a result of a defective
scaffold. The owner was held not liable in that he exercised no control
over the operation.
In Johns Griffiths & Son v. National Fireproofing," the court reaf-
firmed its position in the Claify case, namely that the owner need not be
in charge of the operation in order to be liable under the act. The court
stated:
Since the enactment of this law the owner of the property and every con-
tractor and subcontractor are equally bound by the act to comply with its pro-
visions, and in case of willful failure are liable to the party injured for any
direct damages sustained by reason of such failure. 10
In this case, the court compares the owner's liability under the statute
with that of a municipality. It states that a city is under an obligation to
maintain its streets in a reasonably safe condition, and that if it permitted
other parties to render the streets unsafe, then the city would be liable
to third persons who sustained injuries due to these unsafe conditions.
The statute has imposed upon the owner and the contractor, who were under
no liability whatever at common law in a case like the present, the same kind of
liability which rests upon a municipality, and they cannot escape it."
6 Id. at 222,94 N.E. at 555.
7 172 111. App. 601 (1912).
8 207 111. App. 406 (1917).
9 310 IMI. 331, 141 N.E. 739 (1923).
10 Id. at 335, 141 N.E. at 740.
11 Id. at 340, 141 N.E. at 742.
COMMENTS
This view seems to have been sustained until Taber v. Defenbaugh.r-'
The court denied recovery on the basis that for the owner to be held
liable, proof must be made as to all essential elements under the statute,
and the court flatly asserted that one of these necessary elements is the
fact that the owner is actually in charge of the construction of the build-
ing. It must be pointed out, however, that in this case the person injured
on the premises was not a third party, but was the independent contractor
himself.
In 1957, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Il-
linois in Schmid v. United States"3 view the Illinois statute and stated:
The court is of the opinion that the legislature did not intend that the words
"having charge of" should be idle words but should control the liability provided
for in the Scaffolding Act and place the liability upon the person "having charge
of" the erection. . . . That it did not intend to impose the liability upon the
owner to the exclusion of all other considerations as set forth in the Scaffolding
Act.14
The Supreme Court of Illinois in Kennerly v. Shell Oil Co.15 seems
to have sustained once again the decision rendered in the Claffy
case. Here, defendant hired an independent contractor to construct a
distillation unit for The Shell Oil Co. An employee of the contractor was
injured when he fell from a scaffold built by other employees of the
contractor. Recovery was allowed under the statute against the owner of
the property. Facts existed in that case which clearly showed a violation
of the Structural Work Act and also that the owner had control of the
work. However, the court in its decision never referred to the fact of
the owner's control.
The Scaffold Act deals with highly dangerous activities. It has been regarded
from the outset as intended to fix an independent, nondelegable duty of compli-
ance upon the owner of the property and upon each contractor and sub-con-
tractor engaged in the work. Neither this court not the Appellate Court has
deviated from this construction of the statute, first announced almost fifty
years ago. In the face of this construction, the General Assembly has re-enacted
the section without changing the language that imposes the liability here in-
volved. We are not at liberty to change the meaning of that language now.16
The above statement of the court seems strange in view of the Breton
and Taber cases. The conclusion must be drawn, therefore, that the court
did not consider these cases as holding that the owners need be in charge
of the work in order to become liable under the statute. The dissent in
129 I11. App. 2d 169, 132 N.E. 2d 454 (1956).
13 154 F. Supp. 81 (E.D. IH. 1957).
14 Id. at 89. (Emphasis added.)
15 13 Ill. 2d 431,150 N.E. 2d 134 (1958).
10 Id. at 435-36, 150 N.E. 2d at 137.
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the Kennerly case further points to the fact that the court did not con-
sider this a necessary element to liability. Judge Klingbiel in his dissent
stated that he could not agree with the construction of the statute adopted
by the majority of the court:
It seems evident to me that only those owners "having charge" of the work are
subjected to the detailed requirements as to its performance prescribed by the
various sections of the act.17
The interpretation of the statute by the dissenting judge in Kennerly
was shared by the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Illinois in Pankey v. Hiram Walker & Sons. 8 In that case, plaintiff was
an employee of a contractor hired by the defendant to build a structure
on the defendant's property. While plaintiff was working on a scaffold
constructed by the employees of the contractor, one of the boards tilted.
and caused him to fall to the ground. The court in this case allowed re-
covery against the owner under the Illinois Structural Work Act. In its
decision, the court discussed the various cases which have involved the
act, and concluded that the controlling factors guiding the decision in
those cases are the public policy basis of the statute and the seriousness of
the hazards which the statute was designed to prevent, adding that "faced
with these considerations, the Illinois courts have construed the statute as
one imposing absolute liability in civil cases upon each of the persons to
whom it is expressly applicable. Control of the structural activities is not
a relevant factor."' 9
The theory that liability under the act does not depend-upon the
owners having charge of the work was reasserted in the recent case of
Braden v. Shell Oil Co. 20 In discussing the Kennerly case, the Braden
court interpreted that decision as placing liability on the owner under
the act whether he retains the right of control or not:
Thus it is clear that despite the hiring of the independent contractor, for the
purposes of the Act, the defendant was "in charge" of the work even though it in
fact gave complete charge and control of the premises to the independent con-
tractor. 21
It would appear from the Kennerly decision and the cases following
that the question as to the interpretation of the act is fairly well settled.
However, in view of a recent case, Gannon v. Chicago, M., St. P. &
Pac. Ry.,22 such cannot be construed as the existing view. In this case, a
ladder was placed against a scaffold without being nailed thereto. As a
17 Id. at 441, 150 N.E. 2d at 140.
Is 167 F. Supp. 609 (S.D. I11. 1958). 19 Id. at 613.
20 24 111. App. 2d 252, 164 N.E. 2d 235 (1960).
21 Id. at 254, 164 N.E. 2d at 236. (Emphasis added.)
22 25 111. App. 2d 272, 167 N.E. 2d 5 (1960).
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bricklayer employed by the independent contractor was about to step
from the ladder to the scaffold, the ladder slipped on the ice upon
which it had been placed. Here the owner was shown to have abso-
lutely no control over the work. In its opinion, the appellate court de-
cided that under the statute liability is imposed on the owner: (1) when
he is in charge of the work, and (2) when he wilfully violates the act.
In examining the Kennerly decision, this court interpreted it as holding
that in order to be liable under the act, the owner must be in charge of
the operation. The court pointed out that the facts clearly showed that
the owner in Kennerly was actually in charge of the work, and even
though the court in that case did not find it necessary to recite those
facts, liability was placed on the owner because of his control over the
work. The court declared that "a judicial opinion must be read as ap-
plicable only to the facts involved and is authority only for what is
actually decided. '23 And the Gannon court reasoned, in words set out
below, that the failure of the legislature to eliminate from the statute
the phrase "having charge of the erection" was indicative of their intent
not to make every owner liable in every situation:
If the legislature had wanted to make all owners liable, whether they had
charge of the work or not, it would have been a simple matter-and certainly the
logical solution-to omit the qualifying phrase "having charge of the erection,"
etc. The use of the phrase suggests to us that the legislature reasoned that,
under the requirements of this act, to hold liable any owner under all circum-
stances would be to place upon him an unconscionable, inequitable, and un-
realistic burden .... We feel that the Scaffold Act, as interpreted in the Ken-
nerly case, is applicable to an owner "having charge of the erection .... ."24
SETTLED ISSUES UNDER THE ACT
While the interpretation of the phrase "having charge of the erection"
is unsettled, this is not true as to other questions arising under the act.
The courts of this state have determined that the act is superseded by
the Workmen's Compensation Act,2 5 and that contributory negligence
and the assumption of risk doctrines are not available as defenses to a
violation of the act.2 6 Further, the meaning of "willful violation" of the
act has been clarified in the Kennerly and Gannon opinions.27
23 1d. at 278, 167 N.E. 2d at 8.
24 Id. at 279-80, 167 N.E. 2d at 8. (Emphasis added.)
25 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, 5 138.5, 5A (1959); Kennerly v. Shell Oil Co., 13 111. 2d 431,
150 N.E. 2d 134 (1958); Gannon v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. Ry., 25 111. App. 2d
272, 167 N.E. 2d 5 (1960).
26 Schmid v. United States, 154 F. Supp. 81 (E.D. Ill. 1957); Fetterman v. Production
Steel Co., 4 111. App. 2d 403, 124 N.E. 2d 637 (1954).
2 Kennerly v. Shell Oil Co., 13 Il. 2d 431, 150 N.E. 2d 134 (1958); Gannon v.
Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. Ry., 25 111. App. 2d 272, 167 N.E. 2d 5 (1960).
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In regard to the requirement of the act which makes persons liable
thereunder only for willful violations, the court in Kennerly stated the
accepted law as to what constitutes such a violation. The court con-
sidered a willful violation as being synonymous with a knowing violation,
whereby an owner is liable not only when the dangerous conditions are
known to him, but also when by the exercise of reasonable care, the
existence of such dangerous conditions could have been discovered and
become known to him.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it appears obvious that until the supreme court of this
state clarifies its decision in the Kennerly case, the law will remain uncer-
tain as to whether or not an owner who is not in charge of the work
being done on his premises can be liable under the act. It would appear,
however, that unless the court holds an owner liable under the act regard-
less of any control, the act would have very little meaning. This con-
clusion is based on the fact that if the injured party is an employee of
the independent contractor he cannot bring action against his employer
except as provided by the Workmen's Compensation Act; and if the
owner is not liable unless he has control, which fact exists in relatively
few cases, the employee has no remedy. This would seem to be contrary
to the legislative intent that this is-
an Act providing for the protection and safety of persons in and about the
construction, repairing, alteration or removal of buildings, bridges and other
structures, and to provide for the enforcement thereof.,
28 h... REV. STAT. ch. 48, §5 60-69 (1959).
